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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-
3(k) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on a presumption of 
negligence in a rear-end automobile accident?1 
Because jury instructions are matters of law, the appellate court reviews the 
appropriateness of an instruction under a "correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 846 
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). If the jury instructions as a whole "fairly instruct the jury 
on the [applicable] law," the appellate court will affirm the trial court. IdL Even if the trial 
court has committed error in failing to instruct the jury, the appellate court will not reverse 
without a demonstration that "prejudice stem[s] from the instructions in the aggregate." Id. 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing an unavoidable accident defense theory to be 
presented to the jury? 
A party is entitled to have its theories of the case submitted to the jury so long as the 
theories are viable at law and there is competent evidence to support them. Carpet Barn v. State 
of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "[A party] is entitled to have his case 
submitted to the jury on any theory justified by proper evidence." Morrison v. Perry. 140 P.2d 
772 (Utah 1943). Whether competent evidence exists to support a claim or defense theory is a 
matter of law. Accordingly, the court's actions will be reviewed under a standard of correctness 
of law. Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Disallowing the 
presentation of a theory would be tantamount to a directed verdict against that theory and the 
appellate court can reverse only if the evidence is such that reasonable men could not arrive at 
different conclusions given the evidence. Rhiness v. Dansie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 
(1970). 
Plaintiff has violated Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A) in that plaintiff has 
not provided a citation to the record showing that the issues presented were preserved in the trial 
court. As will be more fully shown in defendant's brief, the plaintiff has failed to preserve a 
number of issues. 
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3. Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiffs Motion for a Judgment NOV 
or a New Trial? 
"An insufficiency of the evidence challenge to a denial of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is governed by one standard of review. The appellate court would 
reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, it 
concludes the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 
17 (Utah 1988). 
"A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Knight v. Ebert. 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
4. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiffs motion to have costs taxed by the 
court? 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan. 795 
P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
RULES AND RELEVANT STATUTES 
The texts of the following rules and statutes are contained in the addendum to plaintiffs 
brief, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(2) appellee refers the court to the same: U.R.C.P. 
50, U.R.C.P. 51, U.R.C.P. 54(d), U.R.C.P. 59, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The action below arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on the 1-15 
freeway, just south of the point of the mountain. (R. 508 at 73). The plaintiff Anna Anderson 
testified that as she approached the Lehi exit on 1-15, there was a change in weather and it began 
to get cloudy. (R. 508 at 72). Thereafter, it became windy, wet, and the snow began to blow 
across the freeway. (R, 508 at 73). Plaintiff admitted pursuant to affidavit that she was 
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traveling at 45 miles an hour, although at trial she stated that she was travelling at 50 to 55 
miles per hour. (R. 508 at 102). The plaintiff testified that she could have been off in her 
estimation as much as 10 miles per hour. (R.508 at 103). Plaintiff also admitted in her affidavit 
that she braked when she entered a cloud of snow. (R. 508 at 104-5). 
Plaintiff has recited in her brief a number of her statements to which she testified which 
are mainly aimed at buttressing plaintiffs theory of the case. But in failing to marshal the 
evidence, plaintiff has chosen not to highlight or even mention those facts which are detrimental 
to her case, but upon which the verdict may have rested. Plaintiffs failure to marshal the 
evidence is more fully discussed infra at 30. 
The evidence which plaintiff failed to marshal is as follows: 
As the plaintiff was approaching and attempting to pass the snow plow, she testified 
"mainly I was focused on the snow plow." (R. 508 at 75). Plaintiff further indicated that she 
saw brake lights ahead of her although she could not see the vehicles. (R. 508 at 75). After 
seeing these brake lights ahead of her, she moved into the center lane, which was the lane in 
which the defendant was travelling and the lane in which the accident occurred. (R. 508 at 76). 
The plaintiff stated that she was nervous prior to the accident (R. 508 at 76), and in fact, was 
paranoid when driving on roads and did not like driving. (R. 508 at 117). She stated that her 
reason for nervousness on the roads was that her brother had been killed in an automobile 
accident. (R. 508 at 117). Plaintiff admitted that she slowed down upon passing the snow plow, 
(R. 508 at 77), and that she braked because she thought she might strike someone. (R. 508 at 
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117). In fact, plaintiff acknowledged that the driver behind her might not have been able to see 
her, and that she was troubled because of that fact. (R. 508 at 117-18). Plaintiff stated that she 
was blinded by the snow. (R. 508 at 116). 
Plaintiffs testimony concerning where she was in respect to the snow plow at the time 
of the accident is inconsistent and contradictory. Under direct examination she estimated that 
she was two minutes past the snow plow, and gave the indication that this meant a long distance. 
(R. 508 at 77). On cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that her previous estimations had 
been that she was within feet of the snow plow. (R. 508 at 109). Plaintiff's statement to the 
responding UHP officer was that she was next to the snow plow. (R. 508 at 124). 
Again, inconsistent and contradictory, the plaintiff stated on direct examination that she 
saw the defendant in her rear-view mirror prior to the accident occurring. (R. 508 at 78). 
However, in prior testimony plaintiff stated she did not see the defendant prior to the collision 
(R. 508 at 119), and that she had no idea where the defendant came from. (R. 508 at 119). 
Plaintiffs statement to the Utah Highway Patrol at the scene of the accident was read to 
the jury. It stated: "The [plaintiff] stated to [the officer] that as she pulled next to a UDOT 
snow removal unit heading northbound, strong winds created a blizzard type effect completely 
engulfing her vehicle." And further, that as she slowed, another vehicle, a 1972 Ford, struck 
her from behind. (R. 508 at 124). The jury knew of other inconsistent statements such as 
plaintiffs admitting, for example, that she told her doctor that her vehicle spun out of control, 
where in reality it only fishtailed. (R. 508 at 125). The plaintiff stated that when the accident 
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occurred she moved forward and then back (R. 508 at 127), and that items on the seats were 
thrown forward and onto the floor. (R. 508 at 128). 
These are items of evidence which the plaintiff should have marshalled, along with the 
following to which Mr. Sharp testified.2 While plaintiff is correct in most of her statement of 
facts as to testimony of Mr. Sharp, particularly that the snow plow hit a pile of snow and 
completely blocked his vision by throwing snow up in the air (R. 509 at 167), plaintiff has 
inaccurately presented some of the testimony of Mr. Sharp. Plaintiff states in her brief at page 
9: "Mr. Sharp acknowledged that it was within the range of his experience that snow plows 
occasionally hit snow and plowed it [sic], and that snow flies from a plow when it hits a drift." 
However, Mr. Sharp's testimony was actually as follows: 
Question: You recognize that snow plows occasionally hit snow and plow it; do you not? 
That is within the range of your experience; was it not? 
Answer: Uh, huh (affirmative). 
Question: Was it within the range of your experience to see snow fly from a snow plow 
and occasionally hit a drift? 
Answer: That is the first time I have ever experienced that. 
Question: Never had the experience of that before? 
Answer: Never. 
(R. 509 at 191). While plaintiffs statement in her brief that it was within Mr. Sharp's 
experience that snow plows occasionally plow snow, the fact that snow flies from a plow when 
2Plaintiff claims that Mr. Sharp's testimony was contradictory. See plaintiff's brief at 
7, n.5. For the purposes of this appeal, this court must assume that the jury found Mr. Sharp 
credible. The appellate court must construe all evidence in defendant's favor. Peats v. 
Commercial Sec. Bank. 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1988). 
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it hits a drift and creates a blizzard effect was not within the range of Mr. Sharp's experience 
as claimed by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff correctly recites the facts which show that the jury could have found that the 
defendant committed no negligent act and acted reasonably under the circumstances. Mr. Sharp 
felt he following the plaintiff at a safe distance, specifically that he was "a football field" behind 
the plaintiff. (R. 509 at 168). By the time Mr. Sharp caught up to the plaintiff, and after the 
plaintiff had been obscured by a cloud of snow, Mr. Sharp was only travelling five to ten miles 
an hour. (R. 509 at 196). 
Plaintiff fails to present the following evidence which, if marshalled, supports the verdict 
in this matter and exhibit further that defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. When 
the snow which had been blown and was completely blocking defendant's vision momentarily 
cleared, defendant immediately saw the plaintiff, braked in order to avoid the accident, and 
bumped the plaintiff. (R. 509 at 167). Defendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas, 
there would have been no accident whatsoever. (R. 509 at 169). The impact was so slight 
defendant felt no movement to his body. (R. 509 at 169). In fact, the impact caused hardly any 
damage to plaintiff's vehicle. (See Exhibit 45 attached hereto in the addendum). 
The defendant stated that he was not in a hurry, particularly that he had no schedule to 
meet. (R. 509 at 181). By the time the accident occurred, it appeared to the defendant that the 
plaintiff was stopped or almost stopped on the freeway. (R. 509 at 195). In fact, defendant 
estimated plaintiffs speed at the time of the accident to be within 5 to 10 miles an hour. (R. 509 
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at 196). Again, this is the evidence which the plaintiff should have marshalled, but did not. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE MATORITY OF ALLEGED 
ERRORS PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to preserve the 
issue of whether plaintiff had a right to an instruction regarding a presumption of negligence. 
Plaintiff never submitted an instruction dealing with any presumption of negligence, but only 
requested an instruction regarding the application of common sense to a given set of facts. In 
addition, plaintiff made no objection to the trial court's failure to give a presumption instruction. 
As a result, the court should not consider the issue. 
I, PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING A 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. There exists no presumption in Utah law that a driver 
who rear-ends another vehicle is presumed negligent. The plaintiff asks this court to adopt the 
holding of the Colorado Supreme Court in Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988). 
However, the case at bar highlights why such a presumption should not exist where the plaintiff 
is contributorily negligent to the extent that the jury may easily find that the defendant is not 
negligent at all. In fact, this was the actual holding of Bettner v. Boring. 
An instruction which includes a presumption of negligence contradicts established Utah 
law. Utah law holds that the mere fact that an accident occurs does not support a conclusion 
that any party is negligent. Also, the statutes of Utah provide reciprocal rights running between 
both following and leading drivers. A rear-end presumption instruction would vitiate and render 
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a nullity common law and the statutes of Utah. A rear-end collision presumption is inapplicable 
under Utah's application of res ipsa loquitur. In Utah, the only benefit a plaintiff derives from 
an application of res ipsa loquitur is defeating a defendant's motion for a non-suit. While in 
Colorado an application of res ipsa loquitur might raise a rebuttable presumption, in Utah only 
an inference arises. The defendant is under no obligation to rebut the inference; the jury may 
simply reject it. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO 
PRESENT AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY. Defendant's 
theory of the case did not rest upon unavoidable accident only, but also upon the defenses that 
the plaintiff was the more negligent party, and that the defendant acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant's only theory was that this incident 
constituted an unavoidable accident and that the jury decided this matter under defendant's 
theory, the trial court nonetheless committed no error. While an unavoidable accident 
instruction is precluded pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Randle v. Allen. 862 
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), an unavoidable accident theory is permissible. In fact, the court in 
Randle specifically stated that parties could argue that the accident was unavoidable and that a 
jury, applying proper instructions on the elements of negligence and burden of proof, could find 
no liability. This is, of course, what happened in this case. 
in , THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. This 
court should not address this issue as plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence. Nonetheless, 
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the evidence admitted exhibits that defendant committed no negligent act, but acted reasonably 
under the circumstances. The jury could have concluded that neither party was negligent, or that 
only the plaintiff was negligent. The evidence showed that the highway was wet and visibility 
was severely diminished, not due to normal weather conditions, but due to a snow plow kicking 
up snow during a period of extreme wind. Plaintiff, already traveling quite slowly, braked after 
her vehicle became engulfed in a cloud of snow. Plaintiff expressed concern that she might hit 
someone, or that she might be hit from behind. There is no evidence that defendant was 
traveling at a speed too fast for conditions, or that he was following the plaintiff too closely. 
As soon as the snow cleared and the defendant was able to perceive the plaintiff, he reacted and 
attempted to avoid the accident. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
DEFENDANT'S COSTS. Although the plaintiff asks this court to reverse the Utah Supreme 
Court and disallow depositions as costs, this court must follow the well-established law that 
deposition and transcript costs are recoverable. A review of the record below indicates that both 
the defendant and court followed the proper procedure in requesting and awarding costs. The 
court found that the deposition costs were reasonable and necessary. A review of the record 
indicates that under Utah law the deposition costs awarded were well within the trial court's 
discretion. Additionally, transcript costs are specifically provided for by statute. 
In sum, defendant maintains that plaintiff has waived her right to review the majority of 
the issues raised in this appeal by failing to preserve them in a timely manner. In any event, 
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none of the claimed errors below withstands careful analysis. Plaintiff has argued no reasonable 
grounds for reversal and the record is clear that plaintiff had her day in court and is entitled to 
nothing more. Defendant requests this court to affirm the jury's verdict as well as the court's 
order awarding costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING A 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR-END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT 
A^  PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE 
Plaintiff never submitted an instruction dealing with any presumption of negligence, but 
only requested an instruction quoting verbatim from Bullock v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 
1975) regarding the application of common sense to a set of facts. Plaintiff can hardly assign 
error to the trial court for failing to give a jury instruction which plaintiff never submitted or 
otherwise requested. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides: 
At the close of evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party 
may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request prior 
to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or 
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all 
objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. 
(Emphasis added). Although under Rule 51 the appellate court is allowed in its discretion to 
10 
review the failure to give an instruction where the issue is not preserved below, the appellate 
court should so act only under unusual circumstances, where the interests of justice urgently so 
demand, and where the aggrieved party has presented a persuasive reason for the appellate court 
to exercise that discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); 
Williams v. Lloyd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166 (1965). In this case, plaintiff has made no 
showing of unusual circumstances or that the interests of justice urgently demand a review of 
this issue. 
Plaintiffs proposed jury instructions were submitted to the court on August 10, 1992. 
After that submission, there is no objection or request on the record asking the court to submit 
the proffered instruction. In accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51, the court gave 
the attorneys the instructions it intended to give to the jury. (R. 509 at 206). Subsequently, the 
court, prior to submitting the instructions to the jury, allowed the attorneys for both plaintiff and 
defendant to make objections and exceptions to the jury instructions. (See R. 510 commencing 
at 216). Although plaintiff was given the opportunity, plaintiff made no record whatsoever in 
regard to the court instructing or not instructing the jury regarding any presumption of 
negligence in a rear-end accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court in King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) refused to 
exercise its discretion in considering an assignment of error as to a jury instruction where 
counsel had an opportunity to enter objections on the record and failed to do so. The party 
claiming an error in the proceedings bears the responsibility of assuring that "the record 
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adequately preserves an objection or argument for review in the event of an appeal." (citation 
omitted). Id. at 621. As stated, the record shows no indication that plaintiff objected to the 
refusal of the court to give her proffered instructions. Since the plaintiff did not preserve any 
objection to the trial court's alleged refusal to instruct the jury on a presumption in a rear-end 
accident, and no such instruction was ever requested, this court should not consider the same. 
B^ THERE EXISTS NO PRESUMPTION IN UTAH LAW THAT A DRIVER 
WHO REAR ENDS ANOTHER VEHICLE IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT 
In fact, the plaintiff admits that Utah courts have not addressed the issue of a rear-end 
collision presumption. See Appellant's Brief at 20. Instead, plaintiff invites this court to follow 
other courts that allegedly hold that there exists such a presumption.3 To accept plaintiff's 
invitation to create such a presumption in the State of Utah would go against well established 
common law and the statutory provisions of the Utah Code. Surprisingly, the case of Bullock 
v. Ungricht. 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975), which plaintiff cites in her support, supports 
defendant's, not plaintiffs, position. 
The Bullock court does not speak of a presumption, but only that "common sense and 
experience" can sometimes lead to a conclusion that a following car has disregarded a duty to 
keep a lookout and to keep the car under control and is, therefore, at fault. As the court points 
3Actually, plaintiff is mistaken when she asserts that it is commonly held that a following 
driver is presumed negligent in a rear-end accident. A thorough review of the cases cited by 
plaintiff indicates that such a presumption is not universally accepted. In fact, the cases which 
plaintiff cites are not even supportive of her own position. See infra page . 
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out: "Such a conclusion is not necessarily correct." Id. at 191. The court in Bullock highlights 
a duty to lookout and a duty to keep a vehicle under control, two points which were highlighted 
for the jury in the instructions in this case. The Bullock court only validates common sense; 
Bullock makes no new law upon which an instruction could be submitted to the jury. 
In addressing whether a directed verdict or a judgment NOV should have been entered, 
the court in Bullock held: 
This court has often affirmed a proposition that unless the facts relating to negligence and 
contributory negligence are so free from doubt that reasonable minds could not differ 
thereon a jury question exists; and that if there is doubt about the matter, it should be 
resolved in favor of according the parties the right of trial by jury of those disputed 
issues. 
Id. In sum, if the facts are so one-sided that the following driver is obviously and as a matter 
of law negligent, then it is proper for the court to enter a directed verdict against the following 
driver, not instruct the jury as to any "presumption." Accordingly, the negligence instructions 
given to the jury in this and many other cases fulfill the needs and the rights of both parties in 
having the jury correctly instructed as to the elements of negligence. Bullock simply does not 
address the presumption issue. 
In the final analysis, whether a plaintiff is hit from the rear, the side, or the front is 
irrelevant. See Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829, 835 (Colo. 1988). What the finder of fact 
should consider is whether the parties involved kept their perspective lookouts, kept their 
vehicles under control, or breached any other duty owing to other drivers on the roads. An 
instruction outlining a presumption overemphasizes the plaintiffs case, and creates in the mind 
IB 
of the jury the proposition that the plaintiff does not have to prove her case, but instead the 
defendant carries the burden of proof. Such a conclusion is not supported by the law of Utah. 
If the appellate court chooses to recognize a presumption in rear-end accidents, the court 
will allow the circumvention of the elements of negligence which need to be proven in a tort 
case. Such an instruction would allow a party who, after passing a vehicle, could swerve 
directly in front of that vehicle, slam on her brakes, cause a collision, and walk into court 
having a burden placed upon the following driver to present exculpatory evidence or have the 
jury forced to find for the plaintiff. The case at bar highlights why such a presumption should 
not exist, where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent to the extent that a jury may reasonably 
find that the defendant was not negligent at all. 
C AN INSTRUCTION ON A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
CONTRADICTS UTAH LAW 
In Utah jurisprudence, the plaintiff always has the affirmative duty of showing that the 
defendant was negligent. Utah law holds that the mere fact that an accident occurs does not 
support a conclusion that the defendant or any other party is at fault or negligent. See, Kitchen 
v. CalGas Co.. Inc.. 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d 476 (1992); 
Williams v. Ogden Union. R.R.. Ry & Depot Co.. 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315 (Utah 1951). 
If a trial court were to instruct the jury that a presumption of negligence exists when a following 
car rear-ends another car, then the trial court would be, in fact, instructing the jury that the mere 
fact an accident happens indicates the defendant was negligent in contradiction of Utah law. 
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The trial court below instructed the jury, to which no objection was made, that it is a 
duty of every driver to use reasonable care to avoid danger. (R. 322). This instruction, 
instruction number 11, further advised the jury that every driver is obliged: (1) to keep a lookout 
for other vehicles and highway conditions which reasonably may be anticipated; (2) to keep the 
vehicle under proper control; (3) to drive at a safe speed, having proper regard for the width, 
surface, and condition of the highway, other traffic, visibility, and any existing or potential 
hazards; (4) to follow another vehicle at a safe distance, with proper regard for both vehicles 
speed, other traffic, and highway conditions; and, (5) to stop or suddenly slow down only after 
observing that it can be done safely, and if an opportunity exists, after signalling. 1± 
As instruction 11 highlights, there are reciprocal rights running from all vehicles to each 
other, i.e. to keep a proper lookout, keep the vehicle under control, drive at a safe speed. 
Likewise, as paragraph 4 of instruction 11 points out, the following vehicle has specific duties 
running to any vehicle in front of it. Similarly, paragraph 5 of instruction 11 points out duties 
running from the plaintiff to the defendant in this case: not to stop or suddenly slow down if it 
cannot be done safely. Any instruction on a presumption of negligence in a rear-end accident 
would vitiate and render a nullity the statutes of the State of Utah in that the duties running from 
the following driver would be emphasized, and the duties applied to the plaintiff in this case 
would be wholly ignored. 
For these reasons, had the plaintiff properly brought this instruction before the court and 
insisted on it being given to the jury, the court would have been well within its discretion and 
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correct as a matter of law in not giving the instruction to the jury. In fact, the plaintiff herself 
points out that numerous Utah cases hold that: "a motorist who collides with a stationary vehicle 
on a highway is not guilty of negligence as a matter of law without respect to the totality of the 
circumstances." See plaintiffs brief at 20-21. Surely, if a motorist who collides with a 
stationary vehicle is not negligent as a matter of law, then an accident involving moving vehicles 
is even less compelling. 
D. A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Contrary to plaintiffs conclusion, Utah's application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
does not support a jury receiving an instruction on the presumption of negligence in a rear-end 
accident. The Colorado Supreme Court in Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988) 
derived its rear-end collision presumption rule from Iacino v. Brown. 217 P.2d 266 (Colo. 
1950), wherein the court created a rear-end collision presumption under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. Id. at 258. The court in Brown applied res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiff, sitting 
in a parked car when the defendant hit him from behind, "could not reasonably be expected to 
account for a cause of the accident not within his knowledge." Id. In this case, the plaintiff can 
be expected to account for a cause of the accident within her knowledge. As will be shown 
hereafter, infra page 32, plaintiff was negligent and there existed an abundance of evidence for 
the jury to find defendant was not negligent or that the plaintiff herself was the proximate cause 
of the accident. 
16 
Plaintiff has failed to recognize that the applications of res ipsa loquitur in Colorado and 
in Utah differ. In Utah, res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine which establishes a 
defendant's duty and breach of that duty. Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Ctr.. 741 P.2d 969, 971 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). To apply res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff must show that: (1) the accident 
was of the kind which in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant used due care; (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of the 
accident under the management and control of the defendant; and, (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff. Id. 971. Even under normal res 
ipsa loquitur standards, the doctrine does not apply in this case. This accident is not one of a 
kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the defendant used 
due care. This accident arose out of extraordinary circumstances where extreme care could have 
been and was exercised by the defendant, but a minor and insignificant touching of the vehicles 
occurred nonetheless. The jury could find that the causative instrument was plaintiffs braking 
vehicle, not defendant's car. But most important, the accident did not occur irrespective of any 
participation at the time by the plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff herself was negligent, and as the jury 
obviously found pursuant to their verdict, the defendant was not negligent. 
Even if the plaintiff could make a showing of all three elements of res ipsa loquitur, all 
she would gain is an avoidance of a directed verdict motion. Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 
348.352 (Utah 1980)(plaintiff applying res ipsa loquitur doctrine has the benefit of getting past 
a defendant's motion for a non-suit). Res ipsa loquitur raises only an inference of negligence, 
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not a presumption of negligence, which a jury may choose to accept or reject. King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 861 (Utah 1992). Thus, unlike Colorado law which 
presumes negligence under res ipsa loquitur, Utah law only infers negligence, which inference 
may be rejected by the jury. The presumption argued by plaintiff cannot be rejected by the jury 
and therefore is distinguishable from Utah law. 
Of further distinction in the application of res ipsa loquitur in Utah is the burden placed 
on defendant once res ipsa is applied. It is said that the burden of going forward shifts to the 
defendant to show that plaintiffs injury could have been caused by a person (including the 
plaintiff) outside defendant's control. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg. Medical Center. 791 P.2d 
193, 199 (Utah 1990). Though the burden of going forward shifts, the burden of producing 
evidence does not shift. "Although the defendant may adduce evidence [of other causes], the 
defendant has no legal obligation to adduce evidence of non-culpability." Ballow v. Monroe. 
699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985)(holding res ipsa establishes no presumption). While at first 
glance there appears to be an inconsistency between the foregoing statement and one that 
defendant has the burden of going forward, if one considers that a jury may simply disregard 
an inference caused by res ipsa loquitur, the inconsistency disappears. This is a clear distinction 
to plaintiffs allegation that a presumption arises. Indeed, after the plaintiff has put on her case 
involving res ipsa loquitur, defendant has his turn and may attempt to show other causes of an 
accident. However, because the jury may simply reject the inference raised by res ipsa, 
defendant has no burden to refute plaintiffs case. Defendant may simply let it go to the jury. 
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Lastly, accepting plaintiffs argument that res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the present 
case, then the most reasonable way for that issue to be presented to the trier of fact is not 
through an instruction applicable only to automobile cases stating a presumption exists against 
the following driver, but instead as provided in the Model Utah Jury Instruction 4.1, the jury 
could simply be instructed as to res ipsa loquitur. There is no need for this court to create any 
new law where the law already fashioned in the State of Utah would be appropriate. 
K THE PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO AN 
INSTRUCTION ON THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE EVEN IF 
THE LAW OF SISTER JURISDICTIONS WERE APPLIED 
As plaintiff has pointed out, the State of Colorado presumes negligence, sufficient to 
make out only a prima facia case, when the following driver is involved in a rear-end collision. 
Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829, 832 (Colo. 1988). In fact the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Bettner stated: 
[W]e cannot conclude that the rear-end collision instruction is required as a matter 
of law in all cases, regardless of the circumstances of the collision, solely because 
the front of one vehicle makes contact with the rear of another vehicle. 
Id. at 834. In Bettner. the defendant's car slid into the plaintiffs car, which happened to be 
approximately 25 feet from the road. The court held that there was not presumption of the 
defendant's negligence since colliding with the rear of the plaintiffs truck bespeaks negligence 
no more than colliding with the front of it. Id. at 835. Instead, in disallowing the use of a 
presumption instruction, the Bettner court said that the particular facts of the case must be 
reviewed. 
19 
The majority of the cases cited by plaintiff support defendant's point of view.4 Both 
Norris v. Gatts. 738 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1987) and Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988) 
disallowed the use of any instruction stating a presumption of negligence in a rear-end accident. 
As far as the cases which plaintiff cites are concerned, only Colorado holds that such a 
presumption instruction may be given and exists. Alaska does not presume negligence, but only 
holds that an inference is raised, and indicates a strict application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. Further, the plaintiff has apparently not appreciated that the cases of Boring v. 
Bettner, 739 P.2d 884 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) and Bettner v. Boring are one and the same case, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado in Bettner v. Boring overturning the Colorado Court of Appeals 
in Boring v. Bettner. The court's analysis in Bettner. accordingly, centered around an 
instruction which was rejected by the trial court, and which rejection was sustained by the 
Colorado Supreme Court. That instruction is cited in full in plaintiffs brief at 20, n.6.5 
In Bettner. the jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Colorado 
4Norris v. Gatts. 738 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1987) does not find a presumption, but only an 
inference of negligence under res ipsa. Likewise, the court in Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66, 67 
(Alaska 1980) did not find a presumption, but held: "Where there is no reason to anticipate the 
conduct of the preceding driver, the driver who follows may not be responsible for the 
collision," and further stated a similar proposition as the Bullock court, "under normal 
circumstances one who rear-ends a vehicle is generally negligent. "Id. 
5Plaintiff states that the instruction quoted in plaintiffs brief at 20, n.6 is an instruction used 
by the Colorado courts. Such a statement is misleading. A review of Bettner only shows that 
that instruction on a presumption was simply a rejected instruction which had been submitted 
by plaintiff's counsel. 
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Court of Appeals determined that the trial court committed reversible error when it declined to 
give the plaintiffs tendered jury instruction on the presumption of negligence arising out of a 
rear-end collision. The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and concluded that the 
trial court's refusal to give the tendered instruction on the facts of the case did not constitute 
reversible error. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Bettner reinstated the jury's 
verdict. IcL 
The court in Bettner explains that the rear-end collision jury instruction is derived from 
their holding in Iacino v. Brown. 217 P.2d 266 (1950), which allowed the use of a presumption 
instruction based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Bettner. 764 P.2d at 832. The court 
in Bettner cited numerous cases explaining the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Colorado including 
Saliman v. Silk. 194 P.2d 304 (1948) which held: 
When it can, with equal reasonableness, be inferred that the accident in question 
was due to another cause then the negligence of the defendant, the doctrine cannot 
be invoked. 
Id, at 305. An objective reading of the Bettner holding indicates that the fact that one car hits 
another from the rear does not entitle one to any instruction, whether considering a presumption 
of negligence or a normal res ipsa loquitur instruction. Instead, the court must look to the 
circumstances of the accident to determine if someone other than the defendant, including the 
plaintiff, might be negligent. 
The court in Bettner reviewed holdings from several jurisdictions, some of which are 
quoted by plaintiff in her brief. Significantly, the court in Bettner cites the case of Clevenger 
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v. Walters. 419 S.W. 2d 102, 106 (Mo. 1967) wherein the court stated: "[N]ot even all rear-
end collisions fall within the [res ipsa loquitur] doctrine." Plaintiffs only argument in the case 
at bar is that since defendant's vehicle made contact with the rear of plaintiffs vehicle, he is 
entitled to an instruction. Yet the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief do not support such a 
conclusion. 
Interestingly, in Bettner. before submitting the case to the jury, the judge gave a directed 
verdict to the plaintiff that he was not negligent. Accordingly, the holding of the court in 
Bettner is that there may be rear-end accidents which occur, where the plaintiff is not negligent 
as a matter of law, a defendant is nonetheless free from negligence as well. The Bettner court 
found: "The record shows that the three elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine were not met 
by the facts of this case, because causes other than defendant's negligence were not sufficiently 
eliminated by the evidence." Id. at n. 4. In sum, the case of Bettner v. Boring. 764 P.2d 829 
(Colo. 1988), which overruled Boring v. Bettner. 739 P.2d 884 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), does not 
support plaintiffs position. 
Plaintiffs citation of Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1980) is misplaced, as it 
supports none of the positions for which it is offered. The Hahn decision, which encompasses 
only 1 and 1/2 pages in the Pacific Reporter, makes no mention of any presumption of 
negligence, but similar to Bullock, states that it is a matter of common understanding that one 
who rear-ends another vehicle under normal circumstances is generally negligent. However, 
when the facts of Hahn are applied to the law stated therein and the holding is thereby gleaned, 
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Hahn only supports the proposition that under the facts of Hahn the trial court should have 
directed a verdict for the plaintiff.6 
As the preceding analysis exhibits, if this court objectively views the case law cited by 
the plaintiff in her support, the court must come to the conclusion that the case law actually 
supports defendant's position, and that any refusal by a trial court to give the proffered 
instruction under the facts of this case constituted no reversible error. 
Even applying the law of Colorado, plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction on the 
presumption of negligence. As plaintiff has stated: "[F]or the presumption to apply, the 
accident must have happened without any fault or negligence on the part of the leading driver." 
See plaintiffs brief at 23. In this case, there is an abundance of evidence that the leading driver 
was negligent and at fault and therefore the instruction should not have been given under any 
circumstances. Accordingly, even if the instruction were a correct statement under Utah law, 
which it is not, there would be no harm or prejudice suffered by the plaintiff in the court's 
failure to so instruct the jury. 
6Plaintiff also cites the Hahn decision in support of her claim that a rear-end collision 
presumption fits the requirements of res ipsa loquitur. See plaintiffs brief at 23. As stated, the 
Hahn decision does not discuss any presumption of negligence, and more clearly, the Hahn 
decision makes no reference whatsoever to res ipsa loquitur. 
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IL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO PRESENT 
AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY 
£* PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO APPEAL PRESENTATION 
OF AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY TO THE JURY 
Plaintiff assigns error to the allusion to or statement of law made as to unavoidable 
accident at three distinct points of the trial. First, plaintiff claims that the court, while 
impaneling the jury, made an introductory statement which in essence set forth defendant's 
unavoidable accident theory. Second, plaintiff contends that instruction number 9, stating that 
the "mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support an inference that any 
party to this action was negligent," is substantially similar to the wording disapproved by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) and is therefore an 
unavoidable accident instruction. Finally, plaintiff contends that defense counsel's closing 
argument also included the theory of unavoidable accident. None of these alleged errors was 
preserved below. As previously noted, in plaintiffs listing of the issues in her brief, she fails 
to identify where in the record she has preserved these issues for appeal. 
As to the introductory statement made by the court, cited in plaintiffs brief at 29, this 
statement to which plaintiff now assigns error was read by the court in the first trial. At the 
time the statement was given to the jury, during the impanelling at the second trial, plaintiff 
made no objection. In fact, there appears absolutely no objection thereto anywhere in the record 
below. Only after the fact, when any problem could not possibly be cured, does plaintiff now 
wish to assign error. Plaintiff has simply waived this opportunity. 
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During the proceedings, plaintiff was given the opportunity to object to any instructions 
which she found to be a problem. Plaintiffs counsel took this opportunity to object to at least 
nine jury instructions as specifically set forth in plaintiffs brief. See plaintiffs brief at 12 and 
R. 510 at 218-19. Significantly, instruction number 9 to which plaintiff now assigns error is not 
mentioned. 
Lastly, the error alleged to have occurred during defendant's closing argument was not 
preserved. As far as closing arguments as to an unavoidable accident defense theory are 
concerned, there was no objection made whatsoever. Plaintiffs sole objection during 
defendant's closing argument, which objection was sustained, concerned defendants asking the 
jury to put themselves in the defendant's "shoes." (R. 510 at 237). Accordingly, as to 
plaintiffs discussion of defendant's utilization of an unavoidable accident theory, this issue has 
been waived by the plaintiff for failure to preserve the matter below. 
B± WHILE AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT INSTRUCTION IS PRECLUDED, 
AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT THEORY IS PERMISSIBLE 
Plaintiff is correct in stating that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) struck down forever the use of unavoidable 
accident instructions in a trial. However, the balance of plaintiffs argument, specifically that 
the trial court committed err in allowing the presentation of an unavoidable accident theory is 
misplaced. Contrary to plaintiffs contentions, the court did not submit to the jury an 
unavoidable accident instruction. Moreover, the plaintiff is mistaken in attempting to construe 
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Randle to hold that there is no such thing as an unavoidable accident or that the plaintiff does 
not have to meet her burden of proof in affirmatively establishing the defendant's negligence. 
In fact, the Randle court expressly stated: 
Of course, accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant 
or defendants are not negligent. In such cases, if the state of evidence warrants it, the 
trial judge should direct a verdict, or the jury, applying proper instructions on the 
elements of negligence and burden of proof should find no liability. 
Id. at 1336. Such was, of course, the defendant's theory of the case as properly stated by the 
court in its preliminary statement. 
The court should note that the statement the court read to the jury at the beginning of the 
case was not a statement outlining the law of unavoidable accident, nor was it a statement which 
emphasized defendant's theory of the case. The statement simply sets up the positions of the 
respective parties and notes that defendant claims he was not negligent and that the accident was 
due to two things: the unusual weather conditions at the time and the negligence of the plaintiff. 
Likewise, in closing argument of defendant's counsel, counsel simply argues that his client was 
not negligent. Whether or not the weather played a role in the accident, and specifically whether 
the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances, are questions for the jury to decide. 
Both defendant's closing argument and the statement read by the court at the beginning of trial 
are both consistent with normal negligence theories and constitute no prejudicial error. 
Plaintiff has alleged that the following instruction is substantially similar to the wording 
disapproved of by the Utah Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen, less the express words 
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"unavoidable accident:" "The mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support 
an inference that any party to this action was negligent." See plaintiffs brief at 29 and the 
instruction given by the court at R. 324. This instruction is found in the Model Utah Jury 
Instructions, number 3.3, and is not the same as an instruction on unavoidable accidents. The 
Randle court's reason for disallowing the further use of the unavoidable accident instruction was 
a fear that a jury might misapply or fail to apply the elements of negligence in finding liability 
for one party or the other. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1335. The court noted that jury instructions 
should be phrased so as to help the jury reach a proper application of the elements of a cause 
of action. The court stated: 
The unavoidable accident instruction, however, circumvents proper application 
of those elements and to that extent allows the jury to reach a result without 
following the principles set out in the usual negligence instructions. 
Id. at 1335. 
The Randle court noted that the unavoidable accident instruction diverts the attention of 
the jury from the primary issue of negligence and unnecessarily "creates the impression in the 
minds of the jurors of a second hurdle the plaintiff must overcome if he is to prevail." Id. 
(citing Graham v. Rolandson. 435 P.2d 263, 273 (Mont. 1967)). Because the "mere fact" 
instruction (hereinafter MUJI 3.3) does not raise the same concerns as an unavoidable accident 
instruction, MUJI 3.3 was properly submitted. MUJI 3.3 does not create an impression in the 
minds of the jurors that a second hurdle for the plaintiff exists. Instead, MUJI 3.3 reminds the 
jurors that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, or alternatively stated, the mere fact that 
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an accident occurred raises no inference in favor of a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant. 
More importantly, there exists a difference between MUJI 3.3 and an unavoidable 
accident instruction which the Randle court itself pointed out. The Randle court noted that the 
concept of an unavoidable accident was historically an affirmative defense to an action for 
trespass, and therefore had to be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Id. at 1334. MUJI 3.3 
has no similar history and is not really a defense at all. Instead, it is an instruction that points 
the jury in the appropriate direction of determining the issue of negligence by examining the 
elements of negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Randle lists a number of cases that it overruled to the extent 
that they had approved the use of an unavoidable accident instruction. Id. at 1336. None of the 
cases recognizing the use of instructions similar to MUJI 3.3 are found on that list. In fact, the 
Utah Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the law in MUJI 3.3, and pointed out that the law 
upon which the instruction is based has long been followed by Utah courts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas 
Co.. Inc., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d 476 (1992). 
Cases allowing an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3 highlight the difference between that 
instruction and an instruction on unavoidable accident. In Williams v. Ogden Union. R.R.. Ry. 
& Depo Co.. 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315 (Utah 1951), the court submitted the following 
instruction to the jury. "The jury is instructed that the mere happening of an accident is not 
proof of negligence on the part of either plaintiff or defendant or evidence of the same." The 
court in Williams held: 
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[The] instruction applies with equal force to the negligence of the defendant and 
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, it 
does not withdraw from the jury consideration of facts and inferences that might 
reasonably be considered by the jury in determining negligence of the defendant. 
Id. at 323. As the Williams court's statement highlights, an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3 
does not emphasize one party's theory over the other's. The instruction is equally applicable 
to both. The Williams decision shows that the giving of an instruction similar to MUJI 3.3 leads 
the jury closer to, not farther away from, a correct analysis of a negligence cause of action than 
if the instruction were not given. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's assertion that instruction number 9 amounted to an instruction 
on unavoidable accident is without merit. An allegation of error on the ground that plaintiff 
presented the theory of an unavoidable accident and argued the same in his closing argument has 
no basis at law considering the fact that the Randle court allowed, and in fact invited, parties 
to continue to present theories of unavoidable accident, but simply not to instruct on the same.7 
7Randle is not the first case to preclude the use of an instruction while allowing 
arguments and theories based thereon to continue. The Supreme Court of Utah in Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) held that the doctrine of last clear chance as a distinct tort 
doctrine was extinguished along with contributory negligence by virtue of the Comparative 
Negligence Act. The court noted: "Our decision here does not preclude argument to the jury 
as to whether a party may or may not have had the "last clear chance" to avoid injury. 
However, the old "all or nothing" doctrine is now subsumed within comparative negligence and 
as bearing on which party was guilty of greater negligence, "last clear chance" becomes just one 
of many factors to be weighed in the comparison by the finder of fact." Id. at 598, n.7. See 
accord. Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987)(discussing assumption of the risk). 
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III. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE. A NEW TRIAL FOR PLAINTIFF 
A. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff alleges that she was entitled to judgment NOV since the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the defendant, supported a judgment only for the plaintiff. Although, 
as plaintiff states, her theory was that she was rear-ended by the defendant without any fault 
whatsoever, see plaintiffs brief at 34, the facts show otherwise. Plaintiff herself recognizes 
that a judgment NOV can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Id. (citing Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Since both 
plaintiffs' motions for judgment NOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial, attack the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, in order to seek review thereof, the plaintiff 
must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that the evidence cannot 
support the verdict. 
In this case, plaintiff fails to marshal the evidence. More specifically, plaintiff has failed 
to follow the appellate court's instructions as laid out in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and more recently recited in Oneida-SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) wherein the 
court stated: 
[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty. . . the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence produced at trial which supports the very finding the appellant resists. 
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Id. Thereafter, the appellant must show the verdict is so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of evidence, thus making the verdict clearly erroneous. Id. The appellate courts 
have noted that the marshalling requirement reflects that the appellate courts do not sit to retry 
cases and will refuse to consider the merits of challenges if the evidence is not marshalled. 
Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence in this case, and in fact, the same could be 
said of plaintiff's arguments as was said concerning a challenged sufficiency of the evidence in 
Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991): "As written, their arguments are 
reasonable and have persuasive effect. From the point of view of appellate procedure, however, 
they ignore the rules designed to give stability to jury verdicts." The court in Hodges found that 
the appealing party had failed to marshal the evidence and stated: "We emphasize it is counsel's 
professional duty to analyze the evidence with care and provide record citations for every 
asserted factual proposition." I(L Appellant's duty implicitly also includes, as stated above, that 
the appellant may not omit items of evidence which hurt her case. Because plaintiff failed to 
marshal the evidence in this case, plaintiff should be precluded from seeking review of this 
matter. 
B. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE VERDICT 
Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, and contrary to the statement of facts cited by the 
plaintiff, the evidence presented to the jury in this case supports the jury's finding of no 
negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff, herself, was forced to admit the nature 
and extent of the adverse weather conditions and the fact that they arose unexpectedly. The 
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defendant testified that he was traveling at a reasonable and prudent speed (50 miles an hour), 
clearly less than the speed limit, and reacted by braking at the first sign of danger, particularly 
seeing snow blow across the road. In fact, plaintiff herself, at this trial conceded to traveling 
at approximately the same speed prior to slowing down for the same perceived problem. This 
brings forth the fact that the plaintiff can point to no evidence presented at trial which supports 
the allegation of negligence on the part of defendant beyond the mere facts that the accident 
occurred and defendant struck plaintiff from behind. 
The appellate court should look to the evidence which the plaintiff failed to marshal in 
order to find an evidentiary basis for the verdict. As provided in defendant's statement of the 
facts, the evidence in this case showed that the weather where the accident occurred consisted 
of wind and blowing snow. The highway was wet and visibility was severely diminished. The 
plaintiff admitted that she was mainly focused on the snow plow, arguably not paying attention 
to the cars in front or in back of her. Plaintiff observed brake lights flashing ahead of her, and 
put on her brakes. She moved into the defendant's lane, and continued to slow down. She 
admitted that she was nervous prior to the accident and has a rather paranoid attitude to traveling 
on the road. 
Plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent concerning her distance from the snow plow. She 
stated she was two minutes past the snow plow, she was within feet of the snow plow, and that 
she was directly next to the snow plow. (R. 508 at 77, at 109, and at 124). Plaintiff herself 
found the snow to be blinding (R. 508 at 116), and she braked because she thought she might 
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strike someone ahead of her, at the same time acknowledging that the driver behind her might 
not be able to see her or stop in time. 
Although at one point in her testimony she claims to have seen the defendant prior to the 
impact, she also stated in prior testimony that she did not see the defendant prior to the 
bumping, and actually had no idea where he came from. She indicated that she had been thrown 
forward and then back and that items in the seat were also thrown forward. (R. 508 at 127-28). 
This evidence indicates that the plaintiff simply stopped too fast and that because of her 
imprudent action a minor bumping between the two vehicles occurred. Upon this evidence the 
jury could have believed that the cause of the accident was plaintiffs negligence, or at most a 
result of severe weather conditions. 
There is no evidence below that the defendant was traveling at a speed too fast for 
conditions, or that he was following the plaintiff too closely. At all times when the defendant 
Mr. Sharp could see the plaintiffs vehicle he maintained a reasonable distance behind her. It 
was only after the plaintiff moved into a cloud of snow and changed lanes that the defendant 
closed the distance between himself and the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff could not be seen, Mr. 
Sharp could only assume, as the law provides, that the plaintiff would not slow too quickly and 
cause an accident. See Mulbach v. Hertig. 15 Utah 2d 121, 388 P.2d 414 (1964). As soon as 
the snow cleared and the defendant was able to perceive the plaintiff, he reacted and attempted 
to avoid the accident. A thorough review of the record below provides no evidence of any 
distance between defendant's and plaintiffs vehicle which could be considered unreasonable 
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under the circumstances. In fact, defendant felt that if the plaintiff had pushed on the gas, no 
accident would have occurred.8 (R. 509 at 169). The defendant testified that he was not in a 
hurry as he had no schedule to meet. (R. 509 at 181). Although he stated that he did know the 
snow plows would plow snow on the highway, he had never experienced snow being thrown up 
by a snow plow and blinding the cars in the area. (R. 509 at 191). The defendant stated that 
the plaintiff stopped or almost stopped prior to impact and estimated her speed at impact at 5 
to 10 miles an hour. A jury could easily have found the person driving 5 miles an hour in a 65 
mile an hour zone even in this bad weather was negligent. The jury could have also found that 
due to the circumstances neither party was negligent. 
The court properly instructed the jury about the duty of drivers, particularly to exercise 
a proper lookout, keep their vehicle at a safe speed, and under control enough to stop suddenly. 
As pointed out, the evidence exhibits that the plaintiff entered a cloud of snow and immediately 
depressed her brakes. The plaintiff testified at her deposition and prior to trial that the impact 
moved her forward, or at least she perceived being moved forward. Plaintiff further testified 
that objects which were on the seat were thrown forward onto the floor. As defendant's counsel 
pointed out in closing argument, applying Newton's Second Law, if one were hit from behind, 
objects would be thrown back, not forward. Plaintiff admitted that she had depressed her brake, 
although she could not recall exactly to what extent she had braked. She believed she did not 
8Plaintiff does state that she was pushing on the gas, but the car would not go any faster. 
(R. 508 at 120). The jury, of course, could disregard this statement if they did not believe her. 
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brake very hard because she allegedly did not have to gear down. However, her statements that 
she moved forward, and the evidence adduced through her testimony that objects in her car were 
thrown forward, indicates she must have been braking quite hard. Such evidence warrants the 
verdict in that the jury could find that the plaintiff entered a cloud of snow during unusually bad 
conditions created, not by normal winter conditions to be expected, but by a snow plow to the 
side of the road, and that the plaintiff stopped hastily and imprudently. 
The jury could have found that the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances. 
As the law of negligence was explained to the jury by the court, the standard of care owed is 
not one of an exceptional driver, but only a reasonably prudent one. The evidence supports the 
jury's finding the defendant acted prudently under the circumstances. 
As plaintiffs cursory analysis as to her entitlement to a new trial exhibits, plaintiff has 
only asserted that she is entitled to a new trial based upon the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(a)(1) and (7). Both of the grounds as stated by the plaintiff are simply a reiteration of her 
previous arguments regarding whether a presumption of negligence exists and an instruction 
thereto should have been given, and whether the jury may consider an unavoidable accident 
theory. Accordingly, there is no reason for defendant to reargue these matters in the context 
of a motion for a new trial. 
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TSL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
DEFENDANT'S COSTS 
The plaintiff asks this court to reverse the Utah Supreme Court.9 The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the expenses of taking depositions are allowable as costs when they are 
reasonably necessary. John Price Assoc. Inc. v. Davis. 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). The 
trial court's ruling on whether to award a party costs of depositions is presumed correct and will 
not be disturbed unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. First 
Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Wright. 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1974). If the trial court is 
persuaded that the depositions at issue were taken in good faith and in light of the circumstances 
appear to have been essential to the development and presentation of the case, then they may be 
awarded as costs. Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
In Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) the appellate court, based upon 
9Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the standards for determining which deposition costs 
should be allowed is unworkable. See plaintiffs brief at 44. Plaintiff makes this claim because, 
in reviewing numerous cases concerning deposition costs, the plaintiff has found that in some 
cases depositions which were not used at trial were taxed as costs, and in other cases they were 
disallowed. However, the focus of plaintiff s analysis is misplaced. Conscientious review of 
the cases cited by the plaintiff indicated that in every instance the court is reviewing whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing or disallowing deposition costs to be taxed. 
Accordingly, as there is great deference given to the trial court and a manifest abuse of 
discretion must be shown in order to reverse the trial court's determination, it is only natural 
that under some circumstances the trial court will allow deposition costs where under other 
circumstances a trial court may not. There is no inconsistency to be found. In every case, the 
appellate courts of Utah have been completely consistent in giving deference to the trial court 
and only reversing the trial court under appropriate circumstances. Particularly, in Lloyds 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg.. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) the appellate court 
did not disallow the costs of depositions, but upheld the trial court's denial of those costs. 
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defendant's original verified memorandum and the findings of the court, found that the plaintiff 
had not shown that the depositions were taken in bad faith or were not essential for the 
development of the case, or that the information elicited could have been obtained through less 
expensive means. The court held specifically: "In light of the nature of this case, we cannot say 
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing these deposition costs." Id. at 476. 
Plaintiff has argued that the case at hand is a simple negligence case with no complex 
theories of liability and causation, and that due to a lack of complexity, deposition costs should 
not have been awarded. See plaintiffs brief at 47. However, when the facts of this case are 
compared with those of Ames v. Maas. also an automobile accident case, plaintiffs claim of 
lack of complexity precluding the award of deposition costs appears meritless. In Ames, the 
plaintiff and the defendant's vehicles were both traveling at a low speed when they reached a 
curve at the same time. Due to the slick conditions of the road, defendant lost control of her 
vehicle, sliding across the center of the road and striking plaintiffs automobile. I<1 at 470. 
Under these facts the Ames court allowed deposition costs. Id. at 476. 
The case at bar was even more complex than Ames. In this case, the parties could not 
even agree on what exactly had happened. There was conflicting testimony on the part of 
plaintiff and it was essential for the development of the case for the deposition of the plaintiff 
be taken. Plaintiff's argument that the case was not complex appears somewhat disingenuous 
as evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff engaged the services of an accident reconstructionist. 
If the case was not complex, then such expert testimony or analysis would not be helpful to the 
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plaintiff. In any event, a review of the facts brings about the conclusion that enough complexity 
concerning the case existed that the depositions were reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs assertion that this case was not complex enough to warrant depositions as a means of 
discovery must fail. 
A* BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE COURT FOLLOWED PROPER 
PROCEDURE IN REGARD TO COSTS 
In the same manner as in the case of Ames v. Maas. defendant submitted his costs 
pursuant to a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements which was verified by defendant's 
counsel. Thereafter, the trial court made specific findings that the deposition costs were 
reasonable and necessary. The trial court's determination as to whether deposition costs are 
reasonable and necessary is not made in a vacuum. The trial judge viewed the evidence, 
reviewed the theories of the respective parties, observed the cross-examination and impeachment 
of the parties and witnesses, and also heard proffers of evidence. Accordingly, the trial court 
needed to receive no additional testimony or other evidence in order to adjudge whether a 
deposition was necessary to the preparation of a case, was used in court, taken in preparation 
of cross-examining an expert witness, or was a deposition of the only objective witness in the 
case. The Utah Supreme Court inLawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating. Inc.. 
27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972) stated: 
Recoverable costs include the expense of taking depositions, unless it is made to 
appear the depositions were unnecessary. Whether the taking of a deposition was 
reasonably necessary to the protection of a party's rights is a question primarily 
for the trial court to decide on all the facts and circumstances of the case. . . . 
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Id. at 609. This is exactly what the court below did. 
Nonetheless, plaintiff claims that defendant in the present case has failed to carry his 
burden of proof as to costs and that the court committed reversible error in granting the costs 
where no evidence was put on that the costs were reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff cites the 
cases of Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Birchcreek Irrigation v. 
Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993) in support of her argument. Both of these cases are 
distinguishable and do not stand for the propositions for which they are submitted. In Morgan, 
the court remanded (not reversed) the issue of costs to the trial court to determine if the 
deposition costs were reasonably necessary. Morgan. 795 at 687. The court did so because the 
findings and conclusions in the divorce decree did not make any finding as to whether the costs 
were reasonable and necessary. IcL In contrast, in this case, the trial court entered an order 
stating: "The court finds the costs submitted by the defendant to be reasonable and necessary 
and sets the amount at $2,100.17." (R. 479). Therefore, Morgan is inapplicable to this case. 
The case of Birchcreek Irrigation v. Prothero is even more irrelevant. In Birchcreek. the 
court's discussion revolved solely around a temporary restraining order as admitted by plaintiff 
in her brief. See plaintiff's brief at 47, n.8. While the court does state that conclusory 
statements will not suffice to support a TRO, the court does so, pointing out: "We require, as 
the rule articulates, an explicit and complete definition of the harm and its irreparable nature." 
Id. at 995. Clearly, the court's decision in Birchcreek was decided under and is applicable only 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(b), whereas the issue in this case has to do with Utah Rule 
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of Civil Procedure 54(d). 
To hold otherwise would be to vitiate the plain language of the Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(d)(2) provides: 
The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment 
serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of the 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, 
and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to 
affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. 
(Emphasis added). Rule 54, therefore, specifically outlines the manner of proof to be submitted 
to the court in regard to costs. As the record in this case indicates, defendant's counsel 
explicitly followed the course of action directed by subsection (d)(2) of Rule 54. 
Where the party seeking costs has followed explicitly the procedure as outlined in Rule 
54(d) and where the trial court has made specific findings and conclusions that the depositions 
were reasonable and necessary, no error can be found. Accordingly, there are no grounds to 
reverse the trial court's award of costs in this matter. 
B^  THE DEPOSITIONS COSTS AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT WERE 
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY 
The deposition costs awarded included the costs of the depositions of the parties. The 
court in Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) specifically held that the depositions 
of the parties are acceptable costs. Id at 476. As a separate basis for allowing the costs, the 
Ames court stated that depositions used in trial are permissible costs. Both the deposition of 
Anna Anderson and Leonard Sharp were used extensively in the proceedings. See e.g. R. 508 
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at 100, 107, 118, 120, 128, and 134, and R. 509 at 187. 
The Ames court also held that depositions of any expert witness the adverse party may 
call are an allowable cost.10 David Beaufort was an expert witness that had been designated 
by the plaintiff. Greg Duval was retained by the defendant, however his deposition was taken 
at the request of the plaintiff. The court awarded the cost of a copy of Mr. Duval's deposition. 
Although the jury determined this case on the basis of liability, the issue of whether a minor 
impact could cause the injuries claimed by the plaintiff was hotly debated. In this regard, expert 
witnesses had been questioned in relation to force as well as fault. Accordingly, the taking of 
their depositions was both reasonable and necessary as held by the Ames court. 
Lastly, the deposition of Michael Sabey was necessary to the development of the case. 
Mr. Sabey was the only objective witness to the accident. Mr. Sabey was called by the plaintiff 
and testified in the first trial of this matter and his deposition was used therein for impeachment 
purposes. (R. 506 at 234). Therefore, because his deposition was necessary for the development 
of the case and because the deposition was used at trial, the deposition of Mr. Sabey was an 
allowable cost. 
10On page 43 of her brief, plaintiff claims that the case of Redevelopment Agency in 
S.L.C. v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) discusses expert witness fees and 
whether they are reimbursable costs under Rule 54(d). This case is, of course, completely 
irrelevant to the present appeal as no expert witness fees were awarded. In this case, only the 
costs of depositions of expert witnesses were awarded as specifically provided for in Ames. 
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^ THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIOR TRIAL WAS A REASONABLE 
EXPENSE UNDER RULE 54(d) 
As has been previously stated, costs are allowed where they are specifically provided for 
by statute, such as witness fees and interpreter fees. Specifically provided for in the Utah Code 
is the cost of a transcript. Section 78-56-8(l)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated provides: "A 
transcript may not be taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is ordered either by 
a party or by the court." In this case, defendant (a party) ordered the preparation of the 
transcript of the prior trial and therefore is entitled to reimbursement of that sum as an allowable 
cost. The court was well within its discretion to allow this cost as it is provided for in the Utah 
Code, but also the role it played in the second trial highlights its necessity. The plaintiffs 
testimony in the second trial was at odds and inconsistent with the prior testimony both in her 
deposition and the transcript of the first trial. The transcript of the first trial provided fertile 
ground for impeachment material and was most likely a material item of evidence in the jury 
disbelieving some of the claims of the plaintiff. See e.g. R. 508 at 100, 111, 113, and 116. 
For these reasons, the transcript was necessary and a reasonable expense, was specifically 
provided for by the Utah Code as a taxable cost, and was properly awarded by the court in this 
matter. Plaintiff has stated no basis upon which this court should find that the transcript should 
not have been taxable as a cost. 
The need for the trial transcript is also highlighted by the fact that plaintiff read in 
excerpts of the testimony of Dr. McClean and Dr. Charles Smith. R. 509 at 156. In that the 
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plaintiff was not reading in the entire transcript of those doctors, it was incumbent upon the 
defendant to review the transcripts in order to assure that the testimony given to the jury was 
complete. It would, of course, be unfair to allow the plaintiff to read a transcript into the 
record, but not afford the opposing party an opportunity to review that same record. 
Lastly, to deny defendant reimbursement of the trial transcript of the first trial is to visit 
the sin of the plaintiff upon the defendant. It was due to the plaintiffs actions, specifically 
conversing and assuming a rapport with a jury member in the previous trial (R. 507 at 372-76), 
that the first trial ended in a mistrial. Had plaintiff not so acted, a second trial would not have 
been necessary. Likewise, it would not have been necessary for the defendant to procure a 
transcript of the first trial. It would be inequitable for this court not to allow the defendants the 
costs of the transcript of the first trial when it was the plaintiff herself who necessitated the need 
for a second trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has waived her right to a review of the majority of the issues raised in 
this appeal by not preserving them in a timely manner. Defendant requests this court to affirm 
the trial court's verdict as well as the court's order taxing costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff has 
argued no reasonable grounds for a reversal and the record is clear that plaintiff had her day in 
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court and is entitled to nothing more.11 
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1
 Plaintiff in her conclusion asks for attorney's fees incurred in bringing this appeal. 
Plaintiff has stated no basis for the award of attorney's fees. She herself brought the appeal and 
therefore cannot claim the appeal is frivolous or brought in bad faith. This litigation does not 
arise out of a contract or any statutory provision allowing for attorney's fees. Absent statutory 
or contractual authority therefore, attorney's fees are not recoverable. Collier v. Heinze. 827 
P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capitol Airwavs. 583 P.2d 
1181, 1183 (Utah 1978). In sum, plaintiffs prayer for attorney's fees is without merit. 
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